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ABSTRACT ■ This article examines changes in socio-economic regulation and
the role of the state in the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, Sweden and Germany,
against the background of the theoretical debate on transition from Fordist to
post-Fordist growth strategies. The first focus is on reforms in the labour
market and the welfare state, and their effect on the political and social
processes through which wage norms are generalized in a national economy.
The second is on the changing role of the state as an institutional form. The
article starts from some basic assumptions of the regulation approach and
delineates the status of the concepts of wage relation and wage
determination, on the one hand, and the state, on the other. It then considers
the debate over modifications to these concepts in the transition from Fordist
to post-Fordist growth strategies, drawing on the trajectories of the five
countries.
Introduction
This article analyses changes in socio-economic regulation and the role
of the state in the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, Sweden and Germany. It
addresses, first, reforms in the labour market and welfare state and their
impact on the procedures and contents of wage determination, the politi-
cal and social processes through which wage norms are generalized in a
national economy. Second, it examines the changing role of the state as
an institutional form, applying some of the basic assumptions of the regu-
lation approach. It then considers theoretical debates over modifications
to these concepts in the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist growth
strategies, in the light of the trajectories in the five countries.
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Regulation Theory and the Wage Relation
The regulation approach is not a unified body of theory: it encompasses
a set of different ideas which might be interpreted as a research
programme in the social sciences. While authors such as Aglietta (1987),
Boyer (1990) and Becker (2002) tend to regard the abstract features of
capitalism as largely constant, they address both crises in the accumula-
tion process and periods of expanded production and growth in the
context of their institutional, social and political ‘embedding’. This
involves, first, a critique of neo-classical economics, in particular its ahis-
torical notion of homo economicus and its assumption of a natural
tendency towards stable equilibrium. Second, regulation theory criticizes
the conventional Marxist view that capitalism will ultimately collapse in
a series of crises. On the contrary, capitalism ‘develops through a series
of ruptures in the continuous reproduction of social relations. Crises are
resolved through an irreversible transformation which allows the funda-
mental or “determinate structure” of capitalism to continue’ (Friedman,
2000: 61).
The regulation approach employs a number of intermediary concepts.
Regimes of accumulation are associated with specific historical phases and
development paths, normally associated with a particular industrial
paradigm. They are based on compatible commodity streams of produc-
tion and consumption, reproduced over a long period of time. A mode
of regulation is an ensemble of social networks as well as rules, norms
and conventions, which facilitate the reproduction of an accumulation
regime. It comprises five institutional forms: the wage relation (or wage-
labour nexus); the enterprise form; the nature of money; the state; and
international regimes. It also includes geographical and temporal dimen-
sions, which Jessop (2002: 21) calls spatio-temporal fixes; these determine
the main boundaries within which structural coherence is ensured. Regu-
lationists describe a historical constellation, in which a regime of accumu-
lation and a mode of regulation complement each other sufficiently to
secure a long era of economic expansion and social cohesion, as a growth
model or a model of development. The stability of such a growth model
is enhanced where a common-sense value system is accepted across all
social classes and groups (Koch, 2001).
Why is ‘regulation’ necessary? Jessop (2002), following Marx, identi-
fies three key contradictions or ‘tensions’ which have to be addressed in
any capitalist society. First, capitalism cannot reproduce itself wholly
through its inherent logic of commodification; this requires a range of
non-commodity forms of social relations as well as ‘fictitious’ commodi-
ties such as land, money, knowledge and, above all, labour power.
Second, many of the contradictions of capitalism can be traced to the
basic contradiction between exchange and use value: productive capital
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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is both an abstract value and a concrete stock of specific assets; the
worker is both an abstract unit of labour power substitutable by others
and a concrete individual with specific skills, knowledge and creativity;
the wage is both a cost of production and a source of demand; money
functions both as an international currency exchangeable against other
currencies and as national money. State economic and social policy has
to maintain social cohesion in a divided, pluralistic society. Third, struc-
tural tensions nonetheless assume different forms and different weights
in different countries. They are also, for the most part, manageable
according to the particular institutional regulation, the specific spatio-
temporal fixes and the hegemonic blocks with which they are occasion-
ally associated. In the face of these tensions, a relatively stable regime of
accumulation and a successful mode of regulation cannot be taken for
granted, but must be understood as the product of a rather fortuitous
and fortunate convergence of relatively independent developments in
different societal fields.
Boyer defines the wage relation as a ‘set of legal and institutional
conditions that govern the use of wage-earning labour as the workers’
mode of existence’ (2002a: 74). It refers ‘to the type of means of produc-
tion; the social and technical division of labour; the ways in which
workers are attracted and retained by the firm; the direct and indirect
determinants of wage income; and lastly, the workers’ way of life’ (Boyer,
1990: 38). In this article, we focus on the determinants of wage income
or, more specifically, the procedures and content of wage determination;
these can be understood as the process by which wage norms are gener-
alized within an economic space. Wage determination is normally
mediated through bipartite or tripartite bargaining at company, sector or
national levels. Despite distinctive national trajectories, the Fordist wage
relation rested on a particular sort of compromise: ‘acceptance of Fordist
production methods in return for productivity gain sharing’ (Boyer,
2002b: 232). This involved the recognition by employers of trade
unionism and centralized collective bargaining, while the unions, for their
part, respected management’s right to control the labour process. Wages
were normally indexed to productivity growth, while monetary and
credit policies were oriented towards the creation of effective aggregate
demand.
In the course of the 1970s, the Fordist growth model experienced a
multilayered crisis, involving the exhaustion of the productivity poten-
tial of economies of scale, the changing demand structures for industri-
ally manufactured goods, the spatial reorganization of the working
process and the new role of financial capital and investment practices
(Lipietz, 1987). There was growing pressure to change the established
forms of wage determination — either the level and/or the content and
orientation of collective bargaining, in particular. Both adaptations
Koch: Wage Determination, Socio-Economic Regulation and the State
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were complemented by corresponding changes in the general mode of
regulation.
In our analysis of national trajectories, we will examine whether
reforms in the labour market and welfare state influenced processes and
outcomes of wage determination one-sidedly in support of capital inter-
ests or whether they helped to form a new, post-Fordist compromise. The
first approach features a lack of wage coordination (with bargaining at
company or individual level) and a general orientation towards (short-
term) capital interests; while in the second, Fordist wage-determination
processes are not abolished, but are developed further to accommodate
both the competitive interests of the employers and the interests of
employees. Wage coordination continues either at the national or sector
level and is oriented towards a balance between capital valorization,
productivity growth, wage increases and labour-market participation.
The Role of the State in Socio-Economic Regulation
The Marxist debate in the 1970s on the role of the state in socio-economic
regulation generated the thesis that a state apparatus formally separated
from all economic agents ‘and the resulting institutionalized division
between “politics” and “economics” is a structural requirement for the
stable reproduction of capitalist societies’ (Hirsch, 2000: 110). Market
forces alone cannot reproduce the basic categories of the capitalist mode
of production — private labour, the securing of private property and the
respect of the principle of equivalence in exchange relations. These
depend on a formally independent institution that, above all, monopo-
lizes the legitimacy of physical force. Regulationists elaborated on this
notion and analysed the state as both ‘an active party in the economy (via
public finances and money) and as constitutive of the environment of the
commodity economy (through the interaction of public policies)’
(Théret, 2002: 123). In the Fordist growth model, the nation-state played
an active role, supporting the wage relation by policies designed to inte-
grate the circuits of the capital and consumer-goods industries, and by
mediating the conflicts between capital and labour over wage issues. It
further helped to achieve growth by promoting capital accumulation
through public infrastructure spending and permissive credit and
monetary policies. Most western European governments also carried out
substantial income redistribution through Keynesian counter-cyclical
economic policies.
In the debate on the changing role of the state in the transition from
Fordism to post-Fordism, regulationists work from the ‘hypothesis that
the nation-state is still a relevant unit of analysis (Boyer, 2002b: 231), even
when a high level of internationalization is de-establishing many of the
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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institutional compromises of each country’ (Boyer, 2002b: 231). The
relationship between the world market and national economies is
addressed as a ‘doubled set of connections’ (Hirsch, 2000: 105): on the
one hand, growth and development potentials of national locations
depend how they are embedded in the international division of labour;
on the other, the latter is itself determined by nation-states which are
themselves results of negotiations and struggles between different classes
and social groups. The leeway for national growth strategies corresponds
to different combinations of these two parameters, while the structure of
the world market is seen as a ‘field of possible positions’ that allows for
the simultaneous existence of a ‘range of mutually compatible national
regimes’ (Lipietz, 1987). In contrast to dependency theories, regulation-
ists do not interpret the international division of labour as socially and
spatially invariable and homogenous, a fixed ‘core–periphery’ relation-
ship, but rather as a ‘variable network’. ‘The global movements of capital
are constantly modified via national formations’ (Hirsch, 2000: 106) and
the socio-economic struggles behind them. Thus the world market is an
unstable balance of dominant and peripheral regions.
In western Europe, as elsewhere in the world, economic international-
ization undermined Keynesian modes of regulation and forced nation-
states to reassess their growth strategies. However, it does not follow that
the role of national governments in areas such as labour-market and social
policy is reduced to one of transmission belts of global ‘constraints’. On
the contrary, from a regulation theoretical perspective ‘globalization’
itself appears codetermined by nation-state growth strategies, and insti-
tutional deregulation and general state withdrawal from economic regu-
lation is not the only option.
Despite consensus among regulationist researchers that there is a
general shift towards a piecemeal transition in state regulation from
demand management to supply management, this transition can be
carried out in different ways and with different effects for the state as an
institutional form in socio-economic regulation. The role of the state can
be weakened in cases where it pushes through reforms that are exclus-
ively in the short-term interest of capital-owners (for example, by attract-
ing international capital through low labour costs and reduced taxes and
contributions, displacing previous objectives such as full employment
and reduction in income inequalities); once these reforms are carried out,
the state withdraws from an active role and leaves regulation to ‘market
forces’. By contrast, the role of the state remains strong where supply-
oriented policies are combined with the maintenance of employment
rights. Such an ‘engaged state’ is generally oriented towards rationaliz-
ation, rather than the downsizing of the labour market and the welfare
state, and continues to invest in key technologies, infrastructure or in an
active labour market policy.
Koch: Wage Determination, Socio-Economic Regulation and the State
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National Trajectories
Comparative regulationist research has demonstrated how the Fordist
wage relation was applied in different nation-states, referring to the roles
that the collective actors as well as specific institutions played in these
processes (Boyer, 1995; Tickel and Peck, 1995). This section elaborates on
these contributions by reconstructing national trajectories according to
the two criteria discussed earlier (see Figure 1). The first axis of our
analysis is the development of the wage-determination process: whether
it has moved towards a model in which capital interests predominate,
typically through a move from wage coordination to bargaining at
company (C) or individual level (I), or towards a new form of com-
promise which reflects not only the short-term interests of employers,
but also the long-term interests of employees. This is normally achieved
through coordinated bargaining at national (N) or sector level (S). The
second axis addresses the changing role of the state in regulation: whether
a country moves towards a ‘weak state’, oriented towards the competi-
tive interests of employers only, or towards an ‘engaged state’, which
initiates or supports attempts to achieve a post-Fordist compromise.
The UK
The Fordist wage relation that prevailed until 1979 was only partly
compatible with an ‘adversarial industrial relations system in which a strong
but decentralized, craft-based union movement and a weakly organized
employer class have impeded consensus on incomes, industrial organiz-
ation, and technical change’ (Rhodes, 2000: 24). British Fordism was
‘flawed’ (Boyer, 1995) as the industrial-relations system proliferated into
hundreds of bargaining units — divided according to skills and tasks and
defended by the trade unions. The diminished potential for increased
productivity, normally associated with Taylorist methods, was reflected in
a rudimentary wage-determination system. Unlike other European
countries, where agreements at national or sectoral level tended to cover a
wide range of substantive issues and to generalize wage movements in corre-
spondence with productivity gains, in Britain the tradition of bargaining and
regulating at company level proved difficult to overcome. Postwar govern-
ments tended to apply policies of Keynesian demand management and to
seek more coordination of wage increases and the labour market in general
(Crouch, 2003), but numerous government initiatives fell victim to the
weakly organized industrial-relations system (Beardwell, 1996). An integral
part of the latter was the relatively strong and legally unrestricted position
of the trade unions at company level: the prevalence of closed shops and
trade unions’ immunity in industrial action, including secondary action.
While the role of the state in socio-economic regulation was weak
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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before 1979, it became an influential actor in the 1980s and 1990s. The
state intervened in industrial relations and the regulatory system with the
aim of making itself redundant. While the Conservative governments
ended previous attempts to achieve more coordination in wage bargain-
ing and labour-market regulation, they used their majority to ‘liberate’
market forces, implementing supply-oriented reforms to improve the
competitiveness of British capital. The various Employment Acts of the
1980s abolished statutory recognition procedures, limited picketing and
Koch: Wage Determination, Socio-Economic Regulation and the State
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FIGURE 1. Wage Determination and State Regulation During and After
Fordism
Weak EngagedSTATE ROLE
WAGE FORMATION/
REGULATION
Uncoordinated/
Capital Oriented
Coordinated/
Compromise
I
C
S
N
KU
KU
S
S
LN
LN
G
G
EE
UK: Continuing lack of coordination in wage determination. Capital-oriented
reforms of the regulatory system. Transition from a weak Keynesian state
towards a weak Schumpeterian state.
Sweden (S): Transition of the wage-determination system from bargaining at
national level to a new compromise with bargaining at sector level. The state
engaged in bringing about and supporting both models.
The Netherlands (NL): Transition in wage determination from automatic
indexation to more flexible principles. The state was a crucial actor in
negotiating a new compromise.
Germany (G): Undermining of the wage-determination system by stealth.
Transition from a moderating state towards a weak state.
Spain (E): Fall and rise of central-level bargaining in relation to wage
determination and regulation. Transition from a strong state that monopolizes
regulation power towards a moderating state.
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first restricted and then prohibited the closed shop (Blanchflower and
Freeman, 1994). Strike immunities were severely restricted and unions
were made liable for the actions of their local representatives. Employers
were permitted to pay non-union employees more than others (Purcell,
1995: 104). Reforms of the welfare system likewise served employers’
interests by reducing the replacement ratio for unemployment benefits
and imposing a tighter conditionality on the willingness to take up work
or training. The reduction in the regulation role of the state was also
expressed in the partial transition towards a private pension system, the
abolition of wages councils and consequently the (partial) minimum
wage, and in cutbacks in public employment and extensive privatization.
The New Labour government, in power since 1997, made no radical
change to the inherited capital-oriented growth strategy. Neither were
the attempts of earlier Labour governments of establishing tripartism and
labour-market institutionalization repeated, nor was the role of the state
in socio-economic regulation, weakened as result of Conservative
policies, enhanced. Nevertheless, reforms were adopted which were
designed to improve the position of employees at company level and to
arrest the increased income inequality and societal disintegration that had
emerged under the Conservative governments (Koch, forthcoming). A
limited right to trade union recognition was enacted and protection
against dismissal was extended to all employees after 12 months’ employ-
ment (Rhodes, 2000: 60–61). In relation to social inequality, the most
important measures were the reintroduction of the minimum wage, the
signing of the European Social Chapter, the reform of the pensions
system (which added a new second and third tier to the existing flat-rate
contributory pension), the introduction of a Working Family Tax Credit
(which was more generous than the preceding Family Credit) and tax
reform designed to be redistributive.
Sweden
Until the 1980s, Sweden’s ‘democratic’ Fordism (Boyer, 1995) was based
on peak-level collective bargaining, designed to achieve wider normative
goals such as full employment and wage equality. Wage determination
involved central negotiations between employer and trade union confed-
erations, sectoral bargaining on the application and adjustment of the
central agreements and company negotiations on any remaining details
(Pestoff, 1995). The state, mainly directed by social-democratic govern-
ments, had played an active and engaged role in bringing about the 1938
Saltsjöbaden agreement, the institutional basis of the new model. Subse-
quently, governments could withdraw from the management of wage
bargaining, which was increasingly carried out bilaterally between strong
unions and a centralized employer organization. As state intervention in
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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wage determination became increasingly unnecessary, governments
supported the general growth strategy through complementary labour-
market and welfare policies. Active labour-market polices stimulated,
among other things, geographical mobility and retraining and was, there-
fore, always ‘supply-oriented’. The universal and generous welfare
regime complemented the trade unions’ ‘solidaristic’ wage policies in
bringing about full employment and a lessening of income inequalities.
Both wage determination and the role of the state changed radically
after the 1970s. In the next decade, there was a shift from central to
sectoral bargaining, and in 1990 the employers’ confederation SAF
formally withdrew from peak-level negotiations (Pontusson, 1997). In
the early 1990s, a Conservative government was elected on a programme
of shifting the priority in economic policy from full employment to price
stability and reduction of the budget deficit. Efforts were made to move
wage determination down to company level, employers’ taxes and contri-
butions were reduced, fixed-term employment contracts were facilitated
and welfare entitlements were reduced (Pontusson and Swenson, 1996).
However, fears that the ‘Swedish model’ would fracture altogether and
would be replaced by a capital-oriented one based on uncoordinated
bargaining at company or individual level were not confirmed. In 1994,
it was once again an engaged state that initiated the reorganization of
wage determination and wider economic strategy. Social-Democratic
governments were re-elected, and sectoral bargaining was not only
preserved, but increasingly coordinated across the economy. The Central
Bank, formally independent after 1993 but still linked to government
policy through its representation on the board, supported sectoral wage
determination with a complementary interest rate policy.
A further method by which the government supported and, if necess-
ary, influenced wage determination was the introduction of an arbitration
institute with the power to intervene in negotiations. Its main function,
however, was seen as creating and enforcing a common basis for negoti-
ation before the actual bargaining round began. The employers signed up
to the new system as they saw it as part of a wider strategy, the govern-
ment-initiated ‘Alliance for Growth’, geared towards the technological
upgrading of Swedish industry (Benner, 2003). Its main features included
state support of sectoral innovation systems in existing areas of industrial
specialization and research into promising technologies (telecommuni-
cations, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and the information sector). The
institutional infrastructure was improved by establishing clusters
bringing together regional actors and organizations. This was comple-
mented by training and retraining programmes for staff and an expansion
of the educational system.
The trade unions agreed to the new growth pact because the social
democrats reversed most of the Conservative reforms in labour market
Koch: Wage Determination, Socio-Economic Regulation and the State
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and welfare regulation. However, the maximum replacement rate of
unemployment benefits was reduced twice, from 90 percent to 80 percent
in 1993 and to 75 percent in 1996, though this remains generous by
comparison with other countries. Active labour-market policy even
expanded during the crisis, with 5 percent of the labour force being
temporarily employed in job-creation programmes (Björklund, 2000:
157). There were other gradual reductions in the generosity of the social
insurance system (introduction of fees, individual contributions, waiting
days as well as a general lowering of replacement rates), a reform of the
pension system to control costs and to increase the supply of labour by
linking pensions to lifelong employment and savings in health and social
service expenditure. However, according to Meidner (1999), these welfare
reforms did not constitute a qualitative break from the ‘Swedish model’.
The Netherlands
Postwar industrial relations were organized in the shared belief that a
high degree of cooperation and centralized bargaining were indispens-
able. Economic policy and major reforms in the labour market and
welfare state were normally negotiated in two national tripartite bodies,
while the translation of these guidelines into socio-political practice was
decentralized. The Stichting van de Arbeid (StAr) was the primary forum
for wage negotiations and employment conditions, while the Sociaal
Economische Raad (SER) focused more on general and longer-term
concerns. Public-sector wages were indexed to private-sector wage
increases, which were, in turn, automatically adjusted to cost-of-living
movements (Hemerijck, 1995: 207). The state was of crucial importance:
the government retained the right to approve or reject wage increases
resulting from collective agreements, and could impose a ‘wage-freeze’ in
case of ‘serious disturbance in the national economy’, and also set the
minimum wage (Hemerijck, 1995). Most governments, normally led by
Christian Democrats, followed a growth strategy based on wage
restraint. The Dutch Fordist compromise consisted in a trade-off
between the government and the unions to establish a ‘low-cost zone’ in
exchange for the recognition of the latter in overall socio-economic
policies. Full employment and relative income equality through wage
indexation were generally recognized as regulatory goals, complemented
by the creation of a comprehensive social security system.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a crisis of the Dutch growth
strategy. Both employers and organized labour became disenchanted
with centralized bargaining as a vehicle of wage restraint, and the public
budget became increasingly unbalanced as a result of growing unemploy-
ment and the practice of coupling wages in the public sector to the
private sector (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). In 1982, the first Lubbers
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
336
05_koch_057214 (jk-t)  29/9/05  2:43 pm  Page 336
administration took the initiative to balance the budget, improve business
competitiveness by tax reductions and wage moderation and restore full
employment by reducing working hours. The first measure was the
abolition of the wage-indexation system in 1982. It was re-established in
1989, on condition that wage increases would not exceed the expected
growth in GDP and that the number of social benefit recipients would
not increase relative to the working population, but excluded public-
sector workers, for whom separate collective bargaining mechanisms
were established. The second measure was the dual strategy of wage
moderation plus reduction in working hours, carried out above all by an
expansion of part-time work (Visser, 2002: 25). Labour-market reforms
included increased ‘flexible employment’ such as fixed-term contracts,
casual labour and variable-hours contracts, but did not lead to pure
‘deregulation’; in 2001, 81 percent of part-time jobs (and 91 percent of
full-time jobs) were still covered by collective agreements (Visser, 2002:
33). The search for more flexibility in working hours to improve the
competitiveness of Dutch companies was complemented by improve-
ments in the work–life balance as individual workers in companies with
10 or more employees were given the right to adjust working hours
(Visser, 2002: 32). The social security of part-time workers was increased
as pro rata social insurance contributions are usually paid in exchange for
pro rata entitlements. The result was a trade-off between labour-market
flexibility and more security for workers with ‘flexible’ contracts (‘flexi-
curity’). The final measure concerned welfare state reforms. The goal of
reducing the budget deficit was accompanied by the qualitative renova-
tion of welfare state entitlements, in which the corporate actors agreed to
move from a labour-substituting to a participation paradigm (Van
Oorschot, 2002). The ‘compromise’ character of these reforms was,
among other things, shown in the possibility of temporary or permanent
wage subsidies for employees accepting a job at a lower wage than their
previous employment and in the relatively high level of state expenditure
for labour-market and welfare policies in general (Koch, forthcoming).
Germany
Germany’s postwar, Fordist growth strategy was based on a distinctive
wage-determination process, which separated sectoral collective bargain-
ing (Tarifvertragssystem) from the company level, where day-to-day
work relations were addressed (betriebliche Mitbestimmung). Wages
were normally negotiated for one sector in one federal state (often the
metal industry in Baden-Württemberg) and set the pattern for other
Länder and other sectors, ensuring standardized wage increases. Sectoral
agreements (Flächentarifverträge) defined minimum standards which
companies were permitted to exceed; and it was possible to include
Koch: Wage Determination, Socio-Economic Regulation and the State
337
05_koch_057214 (jk-t)  29/9/05  2:43 pm  Page 337
so-called ‘opening clauses’ (Öffnungsklauseln) which authorized a
company in precisely defined circumstances to deviate downward.
In companies with at least five employees, employees could be repre-
sented by works councils (Betriebsräte), which regulated the application
of the collective agreements according to the particular needs of the
company and codetermined, among other things, payment methods and
systems, premiums and performance-related pay, holiday schedules,
recruitment and dismissal. In companies with more than 500 employees,
more extensive codetermination rules applied.
The state guaranteed the autonomy of the labour-market parties (Tarif-
autonomie), merely setting the basic parameters within which bargaining
took place (maximum working hours, conditions for fixed-term contracts
and the legal regulation of industrial conflicts). Its capacity for direct
intervention was limited both vertically and horizontally (Streeck, 1997).
Vertical fragmentation stemmed from the federal structure of the politi-
cal system and the prevalence of coalition governments at both federal
and Land levels, making rapid political change difficult. Horizontally,
much of the power over socio-economic regulation was given to
independent authorities such as the Bundesbank or the Federal Cartel
Office, so governments could not initiate Swedish-style industrial
policies. The state was ‘enabling’ and moderating, rather than ‘étatiste’
(Streeck, 1997: 38).
Since the late 1970s there has been rising unemployment, while public
debt, aggravated by the adjustment problems caused by German unifi-
cation (Hinrichs, 2002), rose to a level that made it difficult to meet the
Maastricht criteria. Despite this structural pressure, the Kohl government
between 1982 and 1998 only made gradual changes to the traditional
mode of regulation. Reforms included facilitating fixed-term contracts;
disqualifying employees affected by a strike in the same economic sector,
but in a different region from receiving unemployment benefits; adapting
working-hours legislation to employers’ competitive interests; and
relaxing shop opening hours. However, the impact of these reforms
remained limited (Koch, 2003: 81).
It has been argued that the German model remained ‘firmly intact’
(Klikauer, 2002) because the formal procedures of wage determination
and codetermination were left untouched. However, in the past decade
there has been increasing use of ‘opening clauses’ in sectoral agreements,
allowing firms in economic difficulties to deviate from the minimum
specified conditions. Many commentators perceive this as a covert under-
mining of the principle of comprehensive agreements (Flächentarif-
vertrag) (Hinrichs, 2002) or even as the ‘erosion’ of the entire system of
industrial relations (Hassel, 1999). Despite the formal stability of the
wage-determination system, there is a more or less disguised trend
towards company-level bargaining at the expense of the sector level.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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Though the Christian-Democrat/Liberal governments retained the
tradition of the ‘moderating’ state and refrained from far-reaching
reforms in labour market and welfare regulation, it was paradoxically the
Red–Green coalition, in power since 1998 that took more radical initia-
tives, pursuing supply-oriented reforms. This coalition almost one-
sidedly followed capital interests, without accompanying public
employment policies and strategic investments as in Sweden or reduc-
tions in working hours as in the Netherlands. Employers received relief
from taxes and social security contributions, while the ‘Hartz laws’,
introduced against trade union resistance, severely reduced entitlements
to unemployment benefit. Earnings-related benefits (Arbeitslosengeld I)
now end after one year, after which a revised payment (Arbeitslosengeld II)
is dependent on means-testing and fixed at the level of the old social
welfare benefits (Sozialhilfe). Pressure on unemployed persons to accept
employment in other parts of the country and below their level of skills
has also increased. Since the Christian Democrats have supported these
changes (and indeed now call for more radical initiatives) the normally
slow process of political change has been accelerated.
Spain
Wage determination, industrial relations and state regulation developed
in a distinctive manner in Spain: only with the political transition from
Francoism to parliamentary democracy in the late 1970s and membership
of the European Union in 1986 did a ‘modernization’ of economy and
society take place. The country faced a dual problem: the need to trans-
form a protected and inwardly focused economy into an open and
competitive one, and also to introduce institutions of labour-market and
welfare regulation at a time when other European countries had already
begun to deregulate or restructure them.
In the strict sense of a predominant postwar growth strategy, there was
no Fordism in Spain. However, as similar institutions to those in other
European countries were eventually established, we can speak of a
‘delayed’ Fordism. The state traditionally played a strong role in socio-
economic regulation; in the Franco era, it determined wages and indus-
trial relations by decree and did not permit independent union
representation. In the first post-Franco phase (1977–86), it initiated
tripartite ‘social concertation’ (concertación social) in order to build a new
industrial-relations framework, starting with the Pactos de la Moncloa of
1977 and followed by five additional central agreements. The purpose
was to restrain wage demands, control inflation (then at a very high level)
and foster the recovery of business profits. The government defined a
wage margin based on the expected inflation rate, within which bipartite
bargaining on lower levels could operate, ensuring standardized wage
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increases in line with macro-economic constraints. The 1980 Workers’
Statute (Ley de Estatuto de Trabajadores) and the 1984 Organic Law on
Freedom of Trade Union Organization (Ley Orgánica de Libertad
Sindical) introduced a dual structure of employee representation in
decision-making at the company level: works councils (delegados de
personal in companies with between 11 and 49 employees and comités de
empresa in those with more than 50 employees) and trade union sections
(sección sindical) were given the right to negotiate (and to call strikes) over
issues such as employment contracts, health and safety, personnel policy
and working hours (Van der Meer, 1996).
In the second phase (1986–95), when Spain had joined the EU and the
economy was expanding, there were no further central agreements which
could have served as a benchmark for bargaining rounds at lower levels.
The Socialist government followed its ‘rationalization’ and restructuring
policies with the aim of increasing labour-market flexibility, facilitating
fixed-term contracts and reducing protection against dismissals; but both
the government and the employers’ organization CEOE wished to
maintain centralized bargaining as a means of containing labour costs
(Marsden, 1992). However, both major unions (Comisiones Obreras and
Unión General de Trabajadores) refused, believing that they could
achieve higher wage increases through decentralized bargaining. Simul-
taneously, they organized political protests against the government’s
policies, culminating in three national general strikes between 1988 and
1994. Because of the unions’ resistance, the government imposed its
reforms by legislation; measures enacted included the removal of legal
impediments to fixed-term contracts, legalization of private employment
agencies, further liberalization of dismissal law, and increased pressure on
employees to accept occupational and geographical mobility.
The third phase (since 1996) saw a resurgence of national-level bargain-
ing, somewhat surprisingly as it occurred under the Conservative govern-
ment elected in 1996. Agreements included a new system for voluntary
resolution of conflicts between employees and employers, a reform of the
pension system and a new form of joint regulation of vocational training
(Royo, 2002). Even more significant, as dismissal compensation had been
an extremely contentious issue, was a trade-off between lower compen-
sation for unfair dismissal against a tightening of the use of fixed-term
employment. A new semi-permanent contract with lower dismissal costs
was introduced, while entitlements to unemployment benefits for fixed-
term employees were improved (Golsch, 2003). Lastly, and most signifi-
cantly in the present context, the first central agreement on wage
guidelines since 1984 was signed in December 2001, permitting wage
increases slightly above the expected rate of inflation.
This new compromise reflected a recognition by the unions that decen-
tralized bargaining was not providing the benefits they had hoped, for
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their membership was concentrated in declining industries (Royo, 2002)
and their bargaining power was further weakened by the growing preva-
lence of fixed-term contracts. In addition, the creation in 1991 of an
Economic and Social Council is generally seen as having contributed to
a better atmosphere; while it did not possess formal regulatory powers,
it nevertheless helped to bring different positions closer together. The re-
emergence of central agreements can hence be seen as the result of a
learning process which included the establishment of a new labour-
market institution.
Conclusion
The material reproduction of society in the form of commodities, money,
capital, and the state generates a range of contradictions and tensions that
must be managed or regulated. The correspondence between an accumu-
lation regime and a mode of regulation creates temporary stabilization,
but this does not eliminate the underlying dimensions of crisis at the level
of the mode of production. Moreover, both accumulation regimes and
modes of regulation contain specific dynamics of their own, and crises
result from the disarticulation between the two. It is possible, but by no
means certain, that they can be reshaped to achieve a new articulation as
the basis for a stable growth strategy. The relative success and, at the same
time, the limits of a national growth strategy also depend on the struc-
ture of the international division of labour. Regulation theory assumes a
‘doubled set of connections’ (Hirsch, 2000: 105) between the nation-state
and world market. The possibilities and limits of the growth strategies of
a particular nation-state hence result from the intersection of its distinc-
tive integration in the international division of labour and its internal
socio-economic structure. The fact that this dual relationship shapes
national locations in different ways is the structural background for the
simultaneous existence of different national growth strategies and their
greater or lesser ‘success’.
While this article has dealt with the similarities and differences in
changing socio-economic regulation at the level of the nation-state, the
sustainability of national growth strategies also depends on whether post-
Fordist national trajectories can be complemented by a re-regulation of
the international economic space. Though this is a topic for further
research, the regulation perspective suggests that national governments
are not just at the receiving end of so-called ‘global constraints’; through
their representation in international agencies such as the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and International Labour Organization,
they are potentially crucial actors in the reconstitution of the inter-
Koch: Wage Determination, Socio-Economic Regulation and the State
341
05_koch_057214 (jk-t)  29/9/05  2:43 pm  Page 341
national sphere. In contrast to the Fordist prosperity model, which was
mainly geared to the domestic market and complemented by a relatively
stable international system, today national locations in western Europe
are being restructured and re-regulated in order to accommodate an
international economy which remains under-regulated.
Jessop has described the transition in national socio-economic regu-
lation as a shift towards ‘Schumpeterian’ regimes: national governments
increasingly opt to provide the preconditions for systemic competitive-
ness, permanent innovation and flexibility. This article has elaborated on
this theme, arguing that even given the increased international competi-
tion and the general under-regulation of the global arena, European
governments and policy-makers do not have to compete against each
other by undercutting social and ecological standards. While it is true that
large corporations invest in countries and regions that promise the
biggest net profit, profit margins depend not only on the costs of the
factors of production, but also on their relative productivity. A country
with relatively high taxes can therefore remain attractive to international
capital as long as it offers a highly qualified labour force able to produce
high-quality commodities.
This theoretical position is empirically supported by the comparative
perspective taken in this article. While there is a general trend towards
improving competitiveness through a shift from a demand-oriented to a
supply-oriented mode of regulation, it makes an important difference
whether this shift is carried out solely to increase short-term capital
valorization or as a compromise which combines supply-oriented
changes with reforms in the interest of employees. In two countries, the
UK and Germany, changes in wage-determination processes and other
forms of socio-economic regulation can be said to have primarily served
the interests of employers. In the UK, earlier attempts to establish a
degree of wage coordination were terminated and capital-oriented
reforms were pushed through against trade union resistance. German
trade unions, in contrast, proved strong enough to prevent the abolition
of the centralized wage-determination system and the more advanced
system of welfare regulation; but the increased use of ‘opening clauses’
has weakened sectoral collective agreements, eroding the Flächentarif-
vertrag by stealth; while recent labour-market reforms designed to
diminish labour costs for employers lack elements that could be inter-
preted as in the interest of employees or the unemployed.
Conversely, however, the trajectories of Sweden, the Netherlands and
Spain can be seen as ‘compromises’, as in all cases a temporary break-
down of wage-determination processes at national level was reversed and
wage coordination was resumed. In Sweden, coordinated sectoral
bargaining was consolidated, while central tripartite bargaining was
resumed in the Netherlands and Spain. Though there was no return to
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automatic forms of wage indexation, all three countries established or
retained tripartite institutions designed to facilitate the discussion of wage
issues in wider socio-economic contexts. After rather negative experi-
ences with decentralized bargaining, collective actors (including employ-
ers) started to revalue a link between wages and productivity increases
and economic growth. Particular compromises in socio-economic regu-
lation vary path-dependently from country to country: Sweden’s
‘Alliance for Growth’ combines a technological upgrading of industry
with investments in training for employees, the expansion of the
education system and the retention of a generous welfare state; Dutch
supply-oriented policies to facilitate labour-market flexibility were
complemented with more security for ‘flexible workers’, while the
welfare state was to be renovated, but not downsized; in Spain, dismissal
costs for employers were reduced, but conditions for the use of fixed-
term employment were tightened and entitlements to unemployment
benefits for fixed-term employees were improved.
Theoretically, the changing role of the state in socio-economic govern-
ance is not fully determined structurally: national governments do not
merely execute the real or alleged constraints of globalization, and in
some cases, their strategies combine supply orientation with the
consideration of employment rights. Two cases come close to the ideal
type of a ‘weak state’ (one that intervenes to make itself redundant in the
interest of market forces): the UK and Germany. In the 1980s and 1990s,
British governments identified the improvement of company profitabil-
ity largely with a structural debilitation of the trade unions, the termin-
ation of industrial policies and the privatization of public property. In
Germany, while the Kohl government attempted to preserve the
traditional growth strategy by maintaining the role of the ‘moderating’
state, under the Red–Green government the ‘urgency’ for far-reaching
reforms was emphasized and capital interests were increasingly
supported. In Sweden, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Spain,
governments played a more inclusive role in combining supply-oriented
growth strategies with reforms in the interest of employees (‘engaged
state’). In Sweden and the Netherlands, governments initiated modifica-
tions of the regulatory systems, while employers and trade unions played
rather passive roles. In both cases, governments were crucial in finding
ways out of the crisis, and they remain active in current socio-economic
governance. The Spanish state, which had monopolized regulatory power
under Franco, dispensed parts of this competence to the labour-market
parties. Governments became increasingly ‘moderating’ in their attempts
to reach central agreements.
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